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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Rodney Matt, who suffers from severe Bipolar Disorder, Type I, pied guilty to 
felony driving under the influence (hereinafter, DUI). The district court imposed a five-
year unified sentence, with two and one-half years fixed, and retained jurisdiction while 
Mr. Matt participated in a rider program. He was assigned to the CAPP program, and 
upon arriving at that facility, the program personnel changed his medication regimen. It 
had taken some three years to stabilize his original regimen. 
Unsurprisingly, Mr. Matt did not adjust well to the new medication, and it 
impacted his ability to meaningfully and effectively participate in the rider program. 
Nevertheless, he attempted to complete the rider program, but was not successful. As 
a result, he was returned to the district court with a recommendation that it relinquish 
jurisdiction. His regimen was readjusted when he returned from the CAPP facility and 
he stabilized. Once he did so, he was willing and able to meaningfully and effectively 
participate while on this new regimen. 
Despite that situation, explained to the district court in a letter from Mr. Matt's 
doctor (who advised that the alteration to Mr. Matt's medication regimen was the likely 
cause of his inability to meaningfully and effectively participate in the rider program), the 
district court decided to relinquish jurisdiction. Mr. Matt contends that this was an abuse 
of its discretion. Alternatively, he contends that the district court abused its discretion by 
not reducing the underlying sentence, sua sponte, pursuant to I.C.R. Rule 35 
(hereinafter, Rule 35) when it relinquished jurisdiction. This Court should remedy the 
district court's abuse of discretion. 
1 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Matt has experienced severe mental health issues related to his diagnosed 
Bipolar Disorder, Type 1. 1 (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.9; 
Confidential Letter from Bridgeway Counseling dated 4-13-11.pdf (hereinafter, 4/13/11 
Bridgeway Letter).)2 Mr. Matt's manic episodes have previously included psychotic 
features and have been accompanied by severe anxiety symptoms. (4/13/11 
Bridgeway Letter; PSI, p.9.) Dr. Katrina K. Bentley, who was Mr. Matt's treating 
physician, determined that, while suffering from one of these anxiety attacks, Mr. Matt is 
unfit for work, even if he is taking medication at the time. (PSI, p.9.) At its worst, his 
condition has caused him to attempt suicide on four different occasions. (PSI, p.9.) In 
fact, it took Dr. Bentley three years to identify and prescribe a stable medication 
regimen for Mr. Matt, one which would help him function in society. (4/13/11 Bridgeway 
Letter.) 
In addition, Mr. Matt had a difficult childhood. His father was often drunk. (PSI, 
p.7.) His mother abused him, as well as alcohol. (PSI, p.7.) These issues led to 
1 This is the more severe variety of Bipolar Disorder, in which mood swings between 
mania and depression constitute drastic variations from normal behavior. National 
Institute of Mental Health, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, "Bipolar Disorder," 
pp.4-5 (2008), http://mentalhealth.gov/health/publications/bipolar-disorder/nimh-bipolar-
adults.pdf. These episodes are more drastic and longer in duration than those 
experienced in patients with Bipolar Disorder, Type II. Id. They may also lead to the 
need for immediate hospitalization. Id. 
2 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file 
"Confidential Presentence Report dated July 1, 201 0.pdf." Included in this file is the PSI 
report, as well as several of the documents that were attached thereto (i.e., police 
reports). However, several exhibits which were included with the PSI are contained in 
individual electronic pdf documents. They are initially identified by their electronic 
designation and subsequently referred to by an appropriate shorthand designation. If 
there are multiple pages in the electronic document, they are accompanied by a 
reference to the electronic page number. 
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Mr. Matt dropping out of school. 3 (PSI, p.7.) He was placed in foster care until his 
sisters took him in. (PSI, p.7.) However, he now has a wife and two children, who 
continue to support him. (See, e.g., 4/13/11 Bridgeway Letter.) One of his sisters has 
also articulated her continuing support. (Confidential Letter from Deborah Matt Teske 
11-16-1 0.pdf (hereinafter, 11/6/10 Teske Letter).) 
Nevertheless, Mr. Matt has struggled with alcohol, accumulating several 
misdemeanor, alcohol-related offenses. (PSI, pp.4-6.) The instant offense, however, is 
his first felony charge. (See PSI, pp.4-6.) His mental health issues have limited his 
ability to effectively address these offenses. For example, he cannot get access to the 
DUI problem-solving court because he suffers from a mental health condition, and 
because his underlying crimes are DUls, he is ineligible for the mental health problem-
solving court. (Tr. Vol. 1, p.11, Ls.2-8.)4 Therefore, although a problem-solving court 
may have presented the most appropriate solution in his case, the court imposed a five-
year unified sentence, with two and one-half years fixed, on Mr. Matt and retained 
jurisdJction. (R., pp.124-126.) 
Mr. Matt was subsequently transported to the CAPP facility. (Confidential Report 
from Idaho CAPP Family dated 2-23-2011.pdf (hereinafter, APSI), p.1.) Once there, his 
medication regimen was adjusted (for example, he was switched to the anti-depressant 
Ceylexa).5 (Confidential Letter from IDOC dated May 6, 2011.pdf (hereinafter, 5/6/11 
3 He has since earned his GED. (PSI, p.8.) 
4 The transcripts for the Change of Plea hearing (held on 4/28/10), the Sentencing 
hearing (held on 11/10/10), and the Rider Review hearing (held on 5/18/11, and which 
was a continuation of the original Jurisdictional Review Hearing) are all contained in the 
same bound volume and are consecutively paginated. That volume will be referred to 
as "Tr. Vol. 1." The transcript for the Jurisdictional Review Hearing, held on 4/6/11, is in 
a separately-bound and paginated volume (hereinafter, Tr. Vol. 2). 
5 Dr. Bentley advised the district court that it took three years for her to craft a stable 
medication regimen for Mr. Matt. (4/13/11 Bridgeway Letter.) Clinical Supervisor Joan 
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IDOC Letter), p.1; Tr. Vol. 2, p.8, Ls.18-19.) Clinical Supervisor Joan M. Sheehan also 
noted that Mr. Matt was not ingesting medications at some point during his period of 
retained jurisdiction.6 (5/6/11 IDOC Letter, p.1.) Mr. Matt negatively reacted to these 
adjustments to his medication regimen. (Tr. Vol. 2, p.8, Ls.20-21.) In fact, he was 
placed on suicide watch during the time he was on this altered regimen. (APSI, p.12, 
1/5/11 C-Note (referencing the fact that Mr. Matt was placed on suicide watch); APSI, 
p.11, 1/20/11 C-Note (referencing the fact that Mr. Matt was no longer being given his 
medications)/ Based on her experiences with Mr. Matt, Dr. Bentley explained that 
the alteration to Mr. Matt's regimen and the resulting negative impact would likely 
undermine his ability to meaningfully and effectively participate in the rider programs. 
(4/13/11 Bridgeway Letter.) Nonetheless, Mr. Matt fought to succeed at the 
programming, and his efforts merited two positive entries in his C-Notes for his work. 
(See APSI, p.13, 12/30/10 C-Note; APSI, p.11, 1/20/11 C-Note.) Regardless, the 
M. Sheehan discussed a professional perspective that holds certain medications should 
not be given to recovering alcoholics because they create a similar effect on the 
nervous system as alcohol, presumably to explain why IVlr. Matt's regimen was altered. 
(5/6/11 IDOC Letter, p.1.) Ms. Sheehan also discussed the fact that Mr. Matt had been 
prescribed various anti-depressants since 1999, which included Lexapro. (5/6/11 IDOC 
Letter, p.1.) She appears to justify prescribing Ceylexa by stating it is only a variation of 
Lexapro. (5/6/11 IDOC Letter, p.1.) She does not discuss the impacts such alterations 
to a medication regimen could have on the patient. (See generally 5/6/11 IDOC Letter.) 
She also expressed her opinion that Mr. Matt's condition did not affect his ability to 
participate in the program. (Confidential Email notes from Joan M.Sheehan [sic], LCPC, 
CCS.pdf (hereinafter, Sheehan notes), p.2.) Dr. Bentley informed the district court that 
Mr. Matt is unable to function when he suffers a bipolar episode. (4/13/11 Bridgeway 
Letter; PSI, p.9.) She also informed the court that this alteration in his medication 
regimen could cause him to be unable to participate in the rider program. (4/13/11 
Bridgeway Letter.) 
6 There is a dispute about whether the program staff took him off the medication or he 
stopped taking the medications himself. (Compare APSI, p.11, 1/20/11 C-Note with 
5/6/11 IDOC Letter, p.1.) 
7 The C-Notes are attached to the APSI and will be individually identified with a 
reference to the date they were entered. (APSI, pp.11-14.) 
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program staff reported to the district court that Mr. Matt had resisted all programming, 
looking instead for reasons to not participate.8 (APSI, p.4.) Ms. Sheehan reported that 
Mr. Matt, in fact, presented with a normal mood and, in her opinion, was only trying to 
avoid accepting personal responsibility. 9 (5/6/11 IDOC Letter, pp.1-2.) 
At Mr. Matt's rider review hearing, the district court determined that "he [Mr. Matt] 
appeared pretty disinterested in doing anything." (Tr. Vol. 2, p.10, Ls.5-6.) It decided, 
however, to consider the effect the alteration to the medication regimen would have. 10 
Dr. Bentley, Mr. Matt's former treating physician, advised the district court that this 
alteration in Mr. Matt's medication regimen would likely have impacted his ability to 
meaningfully and effectively participate in the rehabilitative programs. (4/13/11 
Bridgeway Letter.) Ms. Sheehan, a counselor and clinical supervisor at the CAPP 
facility, did not provide an opinion on that question. ( See generally 5/6/11 IDOC Letter.) 
8 The district court imposed Mr. Matt's sentence on November 10, 2010. (Tr. Vol. 1, 
p.19, L.1.) As such, it retained jurisdiction for the next 365 days. I.C. § 19-2601 (4). 
Therefore, its jurisdiction was not set to expire until approximately November 10, 2011. 
(APSI, p.1.) The program staff authored the APSI recommending relinquishment on 
February 23, 2011. (APSI, p.1.) That recommendation was submitted for review on 
March 2, 2011. (3/2/11 C-Note.) The APSI was filed with the district court on March 30, 
2011. (APSI, p.1.) The district court held a rider review hearing on April 6, 2011. 
(Tr. Vol. 2, p.7, Ls.1, 8.) The district court continued the hearing so it could receive 
information about the alteration to Mr. Matt's medication regimen. (Tr. Vol. 2, p.12, 
Ls.17-22.) The hearing was continued and concluded on May 18, 2011. (Tr. Vol. 1, 
p.29, L.1.) The order relinquishing jurisdiction was filed on June 6, 2011. (R., p.143.) 
Therefore, at the latest point in these proceedings, the district court still had 
approximately six months remaining in the statutory grant for Mr. Matt to return and 
complete his rider program while on a stable medication regimen, although there were 
other, earlier points in the process where Mr. Matt could have been returned to the 
rrogram. 
While a patient may initially present as normal, Bipolar Disorder, Type I is defined by 
the patient's major manic and depressive variations from the norm. See National 
Institute of Mental Health, supra note 1. 
10 As both the 4/13/11 Bridgeway Letter and the 5/6/11 I DOC Letter were provided to 
the district court after this hearing, it is presumed they were submitted to inform the 
district court on this matter. ( See R., p.142.) 
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She did, however, explain why part of Mr. Matt's medical regimen was not administered, 
noted that the new medication (Ceylexa) was a variation of one that had been 
previously prescribed (Lexapro), discussed the reason for his placement on suicide 
watch, and suggested that, in her opinion, Mr. Matt was merely trying to not accept 
personal responsibility. (5/6/11 IDOC Letter, pp.1-2.) Dr. Bentley reaffirmed that 
Mr. Matt suffers from Bipolar Disorder, Type I, has recently experienced severe manic 
episodes with psychotic features and severe anxiety, and would be unable to 
meaningfully and effectively participate in programs if his medication were having a 
negative effect on him. (4/13/11 Bridgeway Letter.) In fact, Dr. Bentley suggested 
Mr. Matt be afforded a second opportunity to participate in the rehabilitative programs 
due to the impact the medication change had on his first period of retained jurisdiction. 
(See 4/13/11 Bridgeway Letter.) 
The district court, like Ms. Sheehan, did not discuss what impact the alteration to 
Mr. Matt's medication regimen had on his performance during his period of retained 
jurisdiction before it relinquished its jurisdiction. (R., pp.143-44.) Mr. Matt timely 
appealed from that order. (R., p.148.) He subsequently filed a motion for reduction of 
his sentence pursuant to Rule 35. (R., pp.165-68.) The district court denied that 
motion. 11 (Augmentation - Rule 35 Order.) 
11 The order denying the Rule 35 motion is not challenged on appeal. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction and executed 
Mr. Matt's excessive unified sentence of five years, with two and one-half years fixed, 
for felony DUI? 
7 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Its Jurisdiction And 
Executed Mr. Matt's Excessive Unified Sentence Of Five Years, With Two And One-Half 
Years Fixed, For Felony DUI 
A. Introduction 
While Mr. Matt may have performed poorly during his period of retained 
jurisdiction, he provided the district court with sufficient evidence to demonstrate that his 
sub-par performance was due to the alteration of his medication regimen. As such, the 
district court was without sufficient information from which it could determine whether 
probation could be an appropriate option in Mr. Matt's case. Therefore, it was an abuse 
of discretion to relinquish jurisdiction without giving Mr. Matt a meaningful opportunity to 
successfully complete his period of retained jurisdiction, and in doing so, provide the 
district court with that sufficient information. 
Furthermore, the district court insufficiently considered the evidence that was 
before it when it made its decision to relinquish jurisdiction. Notably, it failed to 
sufficiently consider the impact of Mr. Matt's mental health issues (especially his 
prospects when he is allowed to remain on a stable medication regimen), his prior 
record, his abusive childhood, and his continuing familial support. Therefore, even on 
the evidence available at the time, the district court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction 
constituted an abuse of its discretion. 
Alternatively, a sufficient consideration of the mitigating factors in this case 
reveals that the underlying sentence is excessive and therefore, the district court should 
have reduced it, sua sponte, pursuant to Rule 35 when it relinquished jurisdiction. Not 
doing so constitutes an abuse of the district court's discretion. This Court should 
remedy those abuses. 
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B. The Court's Decision To Relinquish Jurisdiction In Light Of The Evidence About 
The Effect Altering His Medications Had On His Rider Constitutes An Abuse Of 
Discretion 
Mr. Matt asserts that, given any view of the facts, relinquishing jurisdiction and 
executing his unified sentence of five years, with two and one-half years fixed, is an 
abuse of discretion. See State v. Hurst, 151 Idaho 430, 438 (Ct. App. 2011); State v. 
Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137 (2001). The decision to relinquish jurisdiction will not 
be considered an abuse of discretion "if the trial court has sufficient information 
to determine that a suspended sentence and probation would be inappropriate." 
State v. Metwin, 131 Idaho 642, 648 (1998). "The purpose of retaining jurisdiction after 
imposing a sentence is to afford the trial court additional time for evaluation of the 
defendant's rehabilitation potential and suitability for probation." State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 
203, 205 (Ct. App. 1990). 
In making that determination, the district court "considers all of the circumstances 
to assess the defendant's ability to succeed in a less structured environment and to 
determine the course of action that will further the purposes of rehabilitation, protection 
of society, deterrence, and retribution." Statton, 136 Idaho at 137. It is guided in this 
determination by I.C. § 19-2521. Metwin, 131 Idaho at 648. In this regard, the need to 
protect society is the primary objective the district court should consider. See, e.g., 
State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993). Therefore, a disposition that protects 
society and also accomplishes the other recognized sentencing objectives 
(rehabilitation, deterrence, and punishment) will be considered reasonable. See id. 
This is because the protection of society is influenced by each of the other objectives, 
and therefore, each must be addressed in the disposition. See id. 
9 
There are several factors that a court should consider to determine whether the 
objectives are served by a particular disposition. See State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 
318, 320 (2006). They include, but are not limited to: "the defendant's good character, 
status as a first-time offender, sincere expressions of remorse and amenability to 
treatment, and support of family." Id. These factors are also reflected by the factors set 
forth in I.C. § 19-2521. Insufficient consideration of these factors has been the basis for 
a more lenient sentence in several cases. See, e.g., Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 
482, 489-90 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991); 
State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 117 
Idaho 295, 301 (1990); State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982). In this case, the 
district court insufficiently considered the impact of several of these factors in regard to 
Mr. Matt's performance on his rider. 
But more importantly, because of the impact from the change to his medication 
regimen, the district court did not have "sufficient information to determine that a 
suspended sentence and probation would be inappropriate." See Merwin, 131 Idaho at 
648. Therefore, the decision to relinquish jurisdiction constitutes an abuse of the district 
court's discretion. See, e.g., Statton, 136 Idaho at 137; Lee, 117 Idaho at 205. 
1. The Most Critical Factor In This Case Is Mr. Matt's Mental Health 
Condition, The Insufficient Consideration Of Which Alone Reveals That 
The District Court's Decision To Relinquish Jurisdiction Constitutes An 
Abuse Of Discretion 
The first factor the court needed to sufficiently consider was Mr. Matt's mental 
health condition. The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that Idaho Code§ 19-2523 
not just suggests, but requires, the district court to consider a defendant's mental illness 
as a sentencing factor. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999). Mr. Matt's mental 
10 
health has been consistently insufficiently considered and it has prevented him from 
getting meaningful treatment. He is unable to get into the DUI diversion court because 
of his mental illness. (Tr. Vol. 1, p.11, Ls.5-7.) However, he is also ineligible for the 
mental health problem-solving court because his underlying offense is a DUI. (Tr. Vol. 
1, p.11, Ls.4-5.) His mental health issues, therefore, have prevented him from being 
able to participate in those problem-solving courts, which may have provided for 
effective rehabilitation. (See, Tr., Vol. 1, p.11, Ls.9-16 (defense counsel presenting an 
alternative plan to provide Mr. Matt with similar treatment to that he would have received 
in the problem-solving courts).) 
Next, when Mr. Matt began the CAPP program, his medication regimen was 
adjusted. (See, e.g., Tr. Vol. 2, p.8, L.16 - p.9, L. 7.) This adjustment had a negative 
effect on him, affecting his behavior and ability to meaningfully and effectively 
pa1iicipate in the rider program. (See, e.g., Tr. Vol. 2, p.8, L.16 - p.9, L.7.) Dr. Bentley, 
who had been treating Mr. Matt for several years, wrote a letter to the district court 
explaining that when she began treating Mr. Matt, it took three years to stabilize his 
medication regimen. (4/13/11 Bridgeway Letter.) During that process, they found that 
several medications affected Mr. Matt's ability to function or behave properly. 12 (4/13/11 
Bridgeway Letter.) Accordingly, Dr. Bentley advised the court: "It is likely that when he 
was adjusting to medications while incarcerated he may not have been able to 
participate in substance abuse treatment classes due to medication response issues." 
12 This suggests that, while some alternative forms of effective medications might be 
available (i.e., Cylexia instead of Lexipro), the alternative medication could, regardless, 
be ineffective and lead to Mr. Matt's inability to function effectively or appropriately. This 
would result in the deprivation of Mr. Matt's meaningful opportunity to effectively 
participate, even if the medication change was only to an alternate form of his stable 
regimen medications. 
11 
(4/13/11 Bridgeway Letter.) This is a critical medical issue that the district court needed 
to carefully consider in crafting its disposition. A sufficient consideration of this factor 
reveals that changes in Mr. Matt's medication regimen, a factor not entirely within his 
control, would severely impact his ability to obtain meaningful treatment during the 
period of retained jurisdiction. 
The only evidence that is at all contradictory to Dr. Bentley's perspective was the 
opinion from Joan Sheehan, a counselor with the CAPP program. She suggested that 
Mr. Matt actually experiences aspects of an addictive personality, presents normal 
range of emotions, and demonstrates unwillingness to accept personal responsibility. 
(5/6/11 IDOC Letter, p.1; Sheehan Notes, p.2.) This however, does not actually refute 
Dr. Bentley's assertion that the cause of Mr. Matt's inability to perform appropriately in 
the program was the medication alteration. Furthermore, because Bipolar Disorder, 
Type I is defined by major manic or depressive variations from the norm, see National 
Institute of Mental Health, supra note 1, Ms. Sheehan's assertion that Mr. Matt 
presented a normal range of emotion is irrelevant. That Mr. Matt may have been stable 
at some points during his period of retained jurisdiction does not, ipso facto, mean that 
he did not experience bipolar episodes during that time, or that the alteration to his 
medication regimen did not negatively affect his ability to participate in the program. 
Therefore, even if Mr. Matt may have initially presented a normal range of emotions, a 
sufficient consideration of his diagnosed condition reveals that the decision to tinker with 
his medications deprived him of the meaningful opportunity to effectively participate in 
the program. 
Additionally, providing him ineffective medications would not control those 
episodes, thus causing him to be unable to meaningfully and effectively perform in the 
12 
activities. ( See 4/13/11 Bridgeway Letter.) Ms. Sheehan did not discuss the impact an 
alteration to Mr. Matt's medication regimen might have on his ability to perform 
satisfactorily in the CAPP programs. (See generally 5/6/11 IDOC Letter.) Therefore, 
there is no evidence in the record which refutes Dr. Bentley's assertion that the 
alteration to Mr. Matt's regimen deprived him of the ability to meaningfully and 
effectively participate in the program. 
There is, however, evidence that he was, in fact, negatively affected by the 
alteration in his regimen. For example, while on this altered medication regimen, 
Mr. Matt was placed on suicide watch. (APSI, p.12, 1/5/11 C-Note (referencing his 
placement on suicide watch); APSI, p.11, 1/20/11 C-Note (referencing his report that he 
had been taken off his medication).) According to the record, his previous attempts at 
suicide had occurred in 1999, before he began receiving treatment from Dr. Bentley. 
(PSI, p.9.) This indicates that, not only was he experiencing a bipolar episode at that 
time (which contradicts Ms. Sheehan's perspective that Mr. Matt presented a normal 
range of emotions), but also the new medications were not effective in controlling 
his condition. This is consistent with Dr. Bentley's opinion, that Mr. Matt would 
experience severe problems functioning "[w]hen he took medications that he could not 
tolerate .... " (4/13/11 Bridgeway Letter.) The suicide threat indicates that Mr. Matt 
did, in fact, experience a severe problem while on this new medication, demonstrating 
that he was negatively affected by this new regimen. 
The continuing insufficient consideration of Mr. Matt's mental health issues is 
illuminated by the evidence presented in the APSI. The program manager's report 
indicates that, from the beginning of his program, Mr. Matt refused to perform, looking 
instead for ways out of the treatment groups. (APSI, p.4.) However, the APSI does not 
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mention the contradictory evidence contained in the attached C-Notes. For example, on 
December 30, 2010, a note was entered indicating that: "Mr. Matt is actively 
participating in the TAP 19 Relapse Prevention program. He is also engaging in 
[several] core programs at the CAPP facility .... " (APSI, p.13, 12/30/10 C-Note 
(emphasis added).) Specifically, he was working on the "Pre-Release Handbook, Work 
Force Readiness Program, Partners in Parenting, Aztec Skill building programs, Each 
One Teach One, Character Building, Moral Virtue and Mr. Matt is also improving his 
thinking, speaking, dealing with peers." (APSI, p.13, 12/30/10 C-Note.) Furthermore, 
while he was experiencing some struggles, "Group facilitator is not overly concerned 
with these behaviors yet. Mr. Matt has been able to accept input and/or feedback from 
other group members as well as facilitator. Mr. Matt is beginning to connect how his 
behaviors and choices have impacted his life along with causing the consequences 
which has Mr. Matt in this type of setting." (APSI, p.13, 12/30/10 C-Note.) He received 
a similarly positive C-Note on January 20, 2011. (APSI, p.11, 1/20/11 C-Note.) This 
indicates that he had some ability to function, and was putting forth the effort to 
succeed, contrary to the program manager's report. But, as Dr. Bentley indicated, 
without a stabilized medication regimen, it would be unlikely that Mr. Matt could 
meaningfully and effectively participate in the programs. (See 4/13/11 Bridgeway 
Letter.) 
This also reveals that the district court's conclusion that "he [Mr. Matt] appeared 
pretty disinterested in doing anything," is clearly erroneous in light of all the evidence 
before it. (Tr. Vol. 2, p.10, Ls.5-6.) A sufficient examination of this factor - Mr. Matt's 
mental health issues - reveals that when he is receiving a stable medication regimen, 
he is able to function. (See Tr. Vol. 2, p.9, Ls.3-22 (informing the court that Mr. Matt has 
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since been placed on a stable medication regimen and has been able to save money, 
and is willing and able to participate in private treatment opportunities or participate 
meaningfully in another rider program).) However, as his doctor pointed out, altering 
that regimen would affect his ability to meaningfully and effectively participate in such 
programs, particularly if he had a negative reaction to that new regimen. (4/13/11 
Bridgeway Letter.) The evidence demonstrates that Mr. Matt experienced a negative 
reaction while on that altered regimen. (See APSI, p.12, 1/5/11 C-Note.) Despite that, 
he was still working to be constructive. (See APSI, p.13, 12/30/10 C-Note; APSI, p.11, 
1/20/11 C-Note.) Therefore, a sufficient examination of this factor indicates that 
Mr. Matt has the potential to succeed in rehabilitative programming, provided his 
medication regimen is not destabilized. 
Therefore, a sufficient consideration of this factor reveals that Mr. Matt was not 
afforded a meaningful opportunity to effectively participate in the rehabilitative program, 
and so should have been returned to a rider program staying on his current medication 
regimen, on which he has stabilized. 13 (Tr. Vol. 2, p.9, Ls.15-22.) Without providing him 
a meaningful opportunity to effectively participate, the district court did not have 
"sufficient information to determine that a suspended sentence and probation would be 
inappropriate." Merwin, 131 Idaho at 648. It is important to note the Idaho Supreme 
Court's implication, also adopted by the Court of Appeals, that there is a presumption 
that probation will be the result, since the evidence must show that "probation would be 
13 There were at least six months remaining in Mr. Matt's period of retained jurisdiction 
when the district court decided to relinquish that jurisdiction. See n.8, supra. 
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inappropriate."14 Id.; Statton, 136 Idaho at 137 (the district court "considers all of the 
circumstances to assess the defendant's ability to succeed in a less structured 
environment and to determine the course of action that will further the purposes of 
rehabilitation, protection of society, deterrence, and retribution.") (emphasis added); 
Lee, 117 Idaho at 205 ("The purpose of retaining jurisdiction after imposing a sentence 
is to afford the trial court additional time for evaluation of the defendant's rehabilitation 
potential and suitability for probation.") (emphasis added). The evidence does not 
demonstrate that probation would be inappropriate, since Mr. Matt is able to function 
properly when on the appropriate medication, and in that case, would be suitable for 
probation. The only evidence against this conclusion is that Mr. Matt can appear normal 
at times and when he is on the inappropriate medication, he performs badly. Therefore, 
since there is insufficient evidence to determine that Mr. Matt was not suitable for 
probation, the presumption would swggest that Mr. Matt should have been placed on 
probation, or at worst, returned to the program and given a meaningful opportunity to 
14 This is also consistent with the Legislature's instructions in this regard: "The court 
shall deal with a person who has been convicted of a crime without imposing sentence 
of imprisonment unless, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and 
the history, character and condition of the defendant, it is of the opinion that 
imprisonment is appropriate for protection of the public .... " I.C. § 19-2521(1) 
(emphasis added). As the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized in regard to this 
particular statute, the focus is on the intent of the Legislature in providing these 
suggestions to the district court on the exercise of its discretion. State v. Stover, 140 
Idaho 927, 931-32 (2004). The language the Legislature chose to use clearly indicates 
that the district court, when exercising its sentencing discretion, should start with the 
presumption that it will impose probation, unless it finds that society requires the more 
intensive protection provided by incarcerating the defendant. See I.C. § 19-2521 (1); 
Statton, 136 Idaho at 137; Merwin, 131 Idaho at 648; Lee, 117 Idaho at 205. This does 
not mean that everyone convicted of a crime should be placed on probation. See 
Stover, 140 Idaho at 932; see also State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138, 143 (2001) 
(holding that where the State only provides the possibility for probation, there is no due 
process expectation that the defendant will receive probation). Rather, it only indicates 
that the Legislature suggested the district court favor the result of probation unless its 
analysis of the factors indicates incarceration is necessary. See I.C. § 19-2521(1). 
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effectively participate in the program in order to gain sufficient information to overcome 
the implied presumption and determine whether or not probation is inappropriate. 
See, e.g., Statton, 136 Idaho at 137; Merwin, 131 Idaho at 648; Lee, 117 Idaho at 205. 
As a result, the district court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction without providing 
Mr. Matt with a meaningful opportunity to effectively rehabilitate constitutes an abuse of 
discretion. A sufficient consideration of his mental health issues reveals that he has 
some ability to meaningfully and effectively participate in these programs, even when 
his medications are negatively impacting him. Therefore, if Mr. Matt were given the 
opportunity to participate while receiving the proper, stabilized medication regimen, he 
would have a meaningful opportunity to effectively participate in the programs. 
However, without providing that meaningful opportunity to effectively participate, the 
district court cannot have the necessary sufficient information to determine whether 
probation is inappropriate. Id. As such, the district court should have allowed Mr. Matt 
to return and complete his rider while on stable medications, or otherwise placed him on 
probation. Either way, the decision to relinquish jurisdiction without providing that 
meaningful opportunity constitutes an abuse of discretion. Based on this abuse alone, 
this Court should afford Mr. Matt an appropriate remedy. 
2. The District Court's Insufficient Consideration Of Several Other Mitigating 
Factors Further Demonstrates Its Abuse Of Discretion 
In addition to Mr. Matt's mental health issues, there are several other factors that 
the district court insufficiently considered when it decided to relinquish jurisdiction, 
all of which suggest that the more lenient disposition is the appropriate in this case. 
In particular, they are that this was Mr. Matt's first felony, that he had an abusive 
childhood, and that he has continuing familial support. 
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First, the Idaho Supreme Court has "recognized that the first offender should be 
accorded more lenient treatment than the habitual criminal." Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595, 
(quoting State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953), overruled on other grounds by 
State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 228 (1971)). Therefore, it considered the fact that it 
was the defendant's first felony to be a factor in mitigation. Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595. 
Thus, the fact that this is Mr. Matt's first felony, (PSI, pp.4-6), is a factor the district court 
needed to consider in mitigation. 
Second, the district court should have sufficiently considered Mr. Matt's troubled 
childhood, which is a factor it should have weighed against the offense. See 
State v. Williamson, 135 Idaho 618, 620 (Ct. App. 2001 ). In Williamson, the Court of 
Appeals considered the defendant's abusive childhood, which served as a precursor to 
the defendant's abuse of various narcotic substances and played a role in the offense 
before the court. Id. In this case, during Mr. Matt's childhood, his father was drunk and 
his mother physically abused him. (PSI, p.7.) These familial problems caused him to 
drop out of school. 15 (PSI, p.8.) He was placed in foster care until his sisters took him 
in. (PSI, p.7.) The problems culminated with his mother's suicide. (PSI, p.7.) Thus, 
they served as a precursor to his own alcohol problems, which was a factor in his 
offense. Therefore, a sufficient consideration of this factor, particularly in light of his 
mental health issues, reveals that a more lenient disposition is appropriate in this case. 
Third, Mr. Matt has continuing support from his family. Family constitutes an 
important part of a support network, which can help in rehabilitation. See State v. Kellis, 
148 Idaho 812, 817 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding that familial support offered to affirm the 
defendant's innocence does not equate to familial support offered in consideration of 
15 He has, however, since earned his GED. (PSI, p.8.) 
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rehabilitation, implying that had the support been offered for rehabilitation, it would be a 
mitigating factor worthy of consideration), rev. denied. His family has demonstrated its 
continuing support for him in his treatment and rehabilitation. For example, his wife and 
daughters accompany him to meetings with Dr. Bentley. (4/13/11 Bridgeway Letter.) 
One of his sisters has also articulated her continuing support. (See 11/6/10 Teske 
Letter.) And as Mr. Matt indicated during his period of retained jurisdiction, his plan for 
a potential probationary period was to return and live with his family. (APSI, p.14, 
12/19/10 C-Note.) That plan was acceptable to his assigned probation officer. (APSI, 
p.12, 1/10/11 C-Note.) Mr. Matt also has continuing support from Dr. Bentley, who 
informed the district court that, should Mr. Matt be released back into the community, 
she would be willing to continue providing him help and treatment. (4/13/11 Bridgeway 
Letter.) Thus, this factor, too, indicates that a more lenient disposition, one which 
provides a meaningful opportunity to effectively rehabilitate, would be appropriate. See, 
e.g., Carrasco, 114 Idaho at 354-55. 
A sufficient examination of all these factors reveals that a more lenient 
disposition, one aimed at rehabilitation, also addresses all the other objectives -
protection of society, punishment, and deterrence. See State v. Ransom, 124 Idaho 
703, 713 (1993) (requiring that alternative sentences still address all the sentencing 
objectives). When a sentencing court retains jurisdiction, it still imposes and executes a 
sentence. Therefore, both the retributive and the deterrent effects of the imposed 
sentence are still present. See, e.g., State v. Crockett, 146 Idaho 13, 14-15 (Ct. App. 
2008) (discussing how even a sentence for a period of probation addresses all the 
sentencing objectives and how the role that a court's continuing jurisdiction affects 
those objectives), rev. dismissed. Such a sentence punishes Mr. Matt by depriving him 
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not only of his liberty during his period of retained jurisdiction, but several of his rights 
(such as the right to possess a firearm) as well, since this is a felony offense. These 
results, along with the imposed sentence, also serve as a deterrent to society at large. 
See id. Furthermore, it deters Mr. Matt specifically because the sentence need not be 
suspended should he perform poorly while having a meaningful opportunity to 
effectively participate. Even if he completes the rider program and is placed on 
probation, the looming sentence still deters him from violating his probation. 
In this case, the district court does not lose anything in terms of protection of 
society, deterrence, or punishment by continuing to retain jurisdiction. Society receives 
equally similar protection by sending him on a rider as it does by incarcerating him. 
Mr. Matt is in the custody of the Department of Correction either way. He cannot harm 
society during that period, so society is protected whether he is on a rider or in prison. 
Furthermore, the district court retains the ability to leave Mr. Matt incarcerated for the 
entire fixed term of the sentence if Mr. Matt does not show progress after he has a 
meaningful opportunity to effectively participate in his rider program. However, the 
district court could do so knowing that all the sentencing objectives properly addressed 
by the meaningful opportunity to effectively participate. 
What the continued period of retained jurisdiction does provide, that a term 
sentence does not, is the meaningful opportunity to effectively rehabilitate, and as the 
Idaho Supreme Court has noted, timely rehabilitation is more likely to be effective. 
See Owen, 73 Idaho at 402. The Court of Appeals has also recognized that such 
opportunities should be timely and effective. See, e.g., Cook, 145 Idaho at 489; 
see also State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 639 (Ct. App. 1998). In order for Mr. Matt to 
have a meaningful and effective rehabilitative opportunity, he needs to be properly 
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medicated. (See 4/13/11 Bridgeway Letter.) Because his only opportunity to participate 
in the rider program was marred by a maladjusted medication regimen, it was neither 
meaningful nor effective. By not affording Mr. Matt a meaningful opportunity 
to effectively rehabilitate, the district court essentially discounts all potential for 
rehabilitation and successful reentry into society. The Court of Appeals has determined 
that a sentence which operates in that way is unacceptable. See Cook, 145 Idaho 
at 489. 
Therefore, the district court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction without providing 
Mr. Matt with a meaningful opportunity to effectively participate in the rider programs 
constitutes an abuse of its discretion. This is because the district court did not have 
sufficient information to determine whether Mr. Matt would be likely to succeed in a less 
structured environment. See Merwin, 131 Idaho at 648; Statton, 136 Idaho at 137. This 
is also because it did not sufficiently consider all the mitigating factors present in 
Mr. Matt's case. See, e.g., Cook, 145 Idaho at 489-90; Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595. 
Therefore, this Court should remedy that abuse. 
C. Alternatively, The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Not, Sua Sponte, 
Reducing Mr. Matt's Sentence When It Relinquished Jurisdiction 
If the decision to relinquish jurisdiction was appropriate, the district court still 
abused its discretion by not, sua sponte, reducing Mr. Matt's sentence pursuant to Rule 
35 when it relinquished jurisdiction. See, e.g., State v. Goodlett, 139 Idaho 262, 264 
(Ct. App. 2003). The decision to reduce a sentence pursuant to Rule 35 is in the sound 
discretion of the sentencing court and is reviewed under the same standards as the 
original sentencing. See, e.g., State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 450 (Ct. App. 1984); 
State v. Villarreal, 126 Idaho 277,281 (Ct. App. 1994). 
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The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Matt does not allege that his 
sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of 
discretion, he must show that, in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was 
excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria, or sentencing 
objectives, are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public 
generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for 
wrongdoing. Id. The protection of society is the primary objective the court should 
consider. Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500. Therefore, a sentence that protects society 
and also accomplishes the other objectives will be considered reasonable. Id.; 
State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982). This is because the protection of 
society is influenced by each of the other objectives, and therefore, each must be 
addressed in sentencing. Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500. 
There are several factors that a court should consider to determine whether the 
objectives are served by a particular sentence. Knighton, 143 Idaho at 320. They 
include, but are not limited to: "the defendant's good character, status as a first-time 
offender, sincere expressions of remorse and amenability to treatment, and support of 
family." Id. Insufficient consideration of these factors has been the basis for a more 
lenient sentence in several cases. See, e.g., Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595; Cook, 145 
Idaho 489-90. In this case, several of those factors are present, but were insufficiently 
considered by the district court as it crafted Mr. Matt's sentence, and, as a result, the 
sentence does not serve the objectives. However, a sufficient review of these factors 
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reveals that the sentence of five years total, with two and one-half years fixed, is 
excessive and, therefore, the district court abused its discretion by not reducing it when 
it relinquished jurisdiction. 
The district court's insufficient consideration of these factors was discussed in 
detail in Section l(B)(1 )-(2), supra. Mr. Matt suffers from severe mental health issues, 
which are able to be controlled, for the most part, with proper medication. The other 
mitigating factors also indicate a more lenient sentence, one which promotes timely and 
effective rehabilitation, would be appropriate and still serve the other sentencing 
objectives Owen, 73 Idaho at 402 (discussing the need for timely and effective 
rehabilitation); Crockett, 146 Idaho at 14-15 (discussing how even a sentence for a 
period of probation addresses all the sentencing objectives and how the role that a 
court's continuing jurisdiction affects those objectives). 
In Mr. Matt's case, timely and effective rehabilitation would be best achieved by 
providing him with a meaningful opportunity to effectively rehabilitate and then returning 
him to his support network, where he can apply those lessons in a real-life situation. He 
has the support of his family and others, notably, his doctor. (4/13/11 Bridgeway 
Letter.) Being with this support network can aid in the rehabilitation process. 
See Kellis, 148 Idaho at 817. It also addresses his mental health concerns because he 
will be returned to the care and guidance of the doctor who is familiar with his condition 
and who has been working with him for the past several years to ensure he is on a 
stable and effective medication regimen, and thus able to meaningfully and effectively 
participate in society. ( See 4/13/11 Bridgeway Letter.) 
Therefore, the sentence, which requires him to spend at least two and one-half 
years in prison, but as much as five, depending on the determinations of the parole 
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board, 16 is excessive, given a sufficient consideration of the factors, and thus, the 
sentencing objectives. Therefore, the district court's failure to, sua sponte, reduce it 
when it relinquished jurisdiction constitutes an abuse of its discretion. This Court should 
remedy that abuse. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Matt respectfully requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a 
new sentencing hearing with instructions that the court continue to retain jurisdiction 
while he participates on in new rider program. Alternatively, he respectfully requests 
that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate. 
DATED this ih day of March, 2012. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
16 The parole board has broad discretion over whether or not to parole an inmate. 
See, e.g., Stover, 140 Idaho at 931. 
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